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The Public Policy Considerations After 
The America Invents Act and   
Association of Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 
 
Samuel J. Berse 
 
Introduction 
 “It is a chemical entity, but DNA’s importance flows from its ability to encode and 
transmit the instructions for creating humans.  Life’s instructions ought not be controlled by legal 
monopolies created at the whim of Congress or the courts,” writes Dr. James Watson, one of the 
winners of the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 1962 for the discovery of the structure 
of DNA.1  Dr. Watson also proclaims, “[i]n years to come, with the right advances in genetic 
engineering, we may well be able to treat or rectify mental disabilities and physical diseases 
which today are deemed incurable.  Such hope is all the more reason that scientific research on 
human genes should not be impeded by the existence of unnecessary patents.”2  Indeed this 
viewpoint may be well-reasoned, but determining whether a patent is necessary or unnecessary is 
undoubtedly subjective.   
Patents are fundamentally necessary for advancements in scientific research, and stating 
anything to the contrary would oppose the patent system’s purpose.3  Though, with the recent 
Supreme Court decision that largely abolished gene patentability and with the inaction of new 
laws, there are unresolved questions as to whether patents in the field of genetic testing will 
continue to exist in their current form, and with that, what the future will hold for the underlying 
                                                                 
1 Brief for James D. Watson as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 
689 F.3d 1303 (2012) (No. 2010-1406), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/2012_06_15_-
_james_d__watson_brief_on_remand.pdf; James Watson – Biographical, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/1962/watson-bio.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2013). 
2 Brief for James D. Watson as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party, Association of Molecular Pathology v. 
USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303 (2012) (No. 2010-1406) (emphasis added). 
3 Adrian Tombling, Ban on Human Gene Patents is Baffling but it Won’t Impede Biotech Research, THE GUARDIAN 
(June 18, 2013, 8:51 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/science/blog/2013/jun/18/ban-human-gene-patents-biotech-
research). 
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research.4  Courts are in the process of addressing the whirlwind of litigation in this area, and the 
outcomes of each case are uncertain.  This Note summarily addresses some of the consequences 
and the policy and practical implications of the Supreme Court holding that isolated genes are 
unpatentable.5 
Specifically, this Note addresses how new patent law provisions, the Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act (“AIA”), has changed the practice of patent law and considerations that 
courts need to be cognizant of when making future decisions.  Part I addresses the fundamentals 
of patent law that pertain to the subsequent discussions.  Part II addresses the background case 
law that led up to the recent monumental Supreme Court decision, Myriad and the guidance later 
issued by the USPTO.6  Part III discusses the AIA and how it changed the practice of patent law 
with respect to procedures for challenging the validity of patents through post grant proceedings.  
Part IV highlights some of the considerations of the new post grant proceedings in the AIA with 
respect to Myriad.  Finally, this Note concludes that the current state of patent law practice in 
this very particular area is currently sensible, but it is at a very pivotal and delicate point.  With 
crucial court decisions looming on the horizon, patent law needs to evolve in such a way to 
continue promoting research in the genetic testing industry, as opposed to hindering further 
developments.  This will be accomplished by allowing genetic tests to qualify as patent eligible 
subject matter.      
Part I: Patent Law Background 
Pursuant to the Constitution, “[c]ongress shall have the power to . . . promote the [p]rogress of 
[s]cience and useful [a]rts, by securing for limited [t]imes to [a]uthors and [i]nventors the 
                                                                 
4 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
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exclusive [r]ight to their respective [w]ritings and [d]iscoveries.”7  This provision gave rise to the 
United States Patent Act of 1790, and with that, the first patents were born.  A patent is a 
“property right granted by the Government of the United States of America to an inventor []to 
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the 
United States . . . for a limited time in exchange for public disclosure of the invention.”8  The 
United States Patent Act was refined by Thomas Jefferson in 1793, and remained unchanged 
until 1952 when the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) began classifying 
patents into three categories: utility patents, design patents, and plant patents.9  The general focus 
of the Note is on utility patents, which are granted for the invention of “a new and useful method, 
process, machine, device, manufactured item, or chemical compound” or any new and useful 
improvement.10   
In practice, in order to receive a utility patent, an inventor publicly discloses his invention 
in exchange for the approximately twenty-year period of exclusivity to use and practice the 
invention from the date of filing the patent application with the USPTO.11  Through the lengthy 
process of obtaining a patent, the inventor submits a patent application containing claims ideally 
and specifically identifying the proposed invention to the USPTO for review by a patent 
examiner (“examiner”), and the invention becomes publicly disclosed when the patent 
application is published by the USPTO eighteen months after it is filed.12  The examiners 
communicate with the inventors by sending them office actions that include the examiner’s 
                                                                 
7 U.S CONST . art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
8 USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/inventors/patents.jsp (last visited April 19, 2014). 
9 “A patent for an invention is the grant of a property right to the inventor, issued by the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office.” General Information Concerning Patents, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/ 
general_info_concerning_patents.jsp.  
10 Mary Bellis, Utility Patent, ABOUT .COM, http://inventors.about.com/od/definations/g/Utility_Patent.htm. 
11 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). 
12 USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/types/utility.jsp (last visited Apr. 19, 2014); 35 U.S.C. § 122 
(patent applications are published eighteen months after filing and once published, patents are easily available on 
websites such as GOOGLE.COM/PATENTS or HTTP://PORTAL.USPTO.GOV/PAIR/PUBLICPAIR). 
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detailed analysis of the patent application, including the reasons the inventor cannot yet receive a 
patent for the particular invention.13  Examiners will only issue a notice of allowance, which will 
result in the granting of a patent provided that the inventor still wants the patent and pays the 
issue fee, for patent applications that adhere to all applicable provisions.14  The Supreme Court 
case regarding gene patentability, the focal point of this Note, deals primarily with one of those 
provisions for patentability.   
Generally speaking, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics15 was about 
“patent-eligible” subject matter defined under 35 U.S.C. §101.16  This provision identifies four 
categories of patent-eligible subject matter: a process, a machine, a manufacture, and a 
composition of matter.17  All things within the scope of a utility patent must fall within at least 
one of these four categories.18  Genes, defined as the basic units of heredity that are responsible 
for all physical and inheritable characteristics of an organism, were claimed in the utility patents 
at issue in Myriad because genes are chemical compounds or a composition of matter.19  
Examples of patent ineligible subject matter, or the so-called judicial exceptions, include: “laws 
of nature, physical or natural phenomenon, and abstract ideas.”20  Once claims have been 
determined to be patent-eligible, whether by an examiner or in court, the patentability inquiry 
proceeds to other provisions that, for example, assess novelty and nonobviousness.21 
                                                                 
13 37 CFR § 1.104 
14 37 CFR § 1.311 
15 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2107. 
16 35 U.S.C §101. 
17 Id. 
18 Id.; Z. Peter Sawicki, Visala C. Goswitz & Amanda Prose, Patenting Biologicals: Myriad Issues and Options in 
the Wake of Myriad, BENCH & BAR OF MINNESOTA, Sept. 2013. at 24, 24. http://mnbenchbar-digital.com/ 
mnbenchbar/september_2013#pg24. 
19 DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/gene (last visited Mar. 22, 2014); “A patent for an 
invention is the grant of a property right to the inventor, issued by the United States Patent and Trademark Office.” 
General Information Concerning Patents, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/general_info_concerning 
_patents.jsp.  
20 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)). 
21 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103. 
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As of Myriad, the USPTO had granted thousands of gene patents for over thirty years.22  
The USPTO even reaffirmed those guidelines in 2001.23  But, in Myriad the Court essentially 
held that patents can no longer be granted for the simple discovery that a particular human gene 
sequence corresponds to a specific inheritable trait.24  Thus, without expressly acknowledging 
Dr. Watson’s views, the Court nonetheless fundamentally agreed with him that genes should not 
be patentable, but not because they are unnecessary patents, but because the discovery of a gene 
is unpatentable.25  
Part II: Myriad and Patent Eligible Subject Matter 
A: Recent Case Law 
On June 16, 1980, the Supreme Court decided its first modern-day pivotal case in the 
area of patent eligible subject matter.26  In Chakrabarty, the Court ruled that “[a] live, human-
made micro-organism is patentable subject matter under § 101.”27  Looking at the legislative 
history, the Court opined that “Congress contemplated that patent laws should be given wide 
scope . . . and broad construction.  While laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas 
are not patentable [the claims are] to composition of matter -- a product of human ingenuity 
‘having a distinctive name, character [and] use.’”28  This opinion was revolutionary for its time 
because the patent examiner had previously rejected the patent on the grounds that micro-
organisms are products of nature and that living thing were unpatentable subject matter.29  Yet, 
crucial to the court’s holding in overcoming that analysis, the Court found the inventor produced 
                                                                 
22 See Eric J. Rogers, Can You Patent Genes? Yes and No, 93 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 19 (2010). 
23 66 Fed. Reg. 1092-94 (Jan. 5, 2001). 
24 See generally, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107. 
25 See generally, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107. 
26 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615, Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 
127). 
29 Id. at 306. 
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a new bacterium that had markedly different characteristics from bacterium found in nature.30  
Those characteristics were further found to have the potential for significant utility, and thus, the 
bacterium was patent eligible subject matter.31  Importantly, the court explained that not all 
differences rise to the level of “marked differences.”32  “Marked differences” must be significant 
differences that are more than incidental or trivial differences.33 
Three decades later in Bilski v. Kappos,34 the Court found that a claimed process at issue 
was unpatentable subject matter, and thus invalid, when it involved an abstract idea that broadly 
preempted its use in all fields.35  Processes are patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, 
but in this case, the claimed process was found to be the abstract idea of hedging risk in the 
energy business, and the process was unpatentable because “[h]edging is a fundamental 
economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce and taught in any introductory 
finance class.36  The Court opined that the 1952 Patent Act did not expand the scope of 
patentable subject matter to include any series of steps as a process under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and 
that “[t]he patent application here can be rejected under our precedents on the unpatentability of 
abstract ideas.”37         
Two years after Bilksi, in March 2012, the Supreme Court held in Mayo Collab. Servs. v. 
Prometheus Labs.38 that Prometheus' medical test, which determined the proper dosage of a 
                                                                 
30 Id. at 311. 
31 Id. at 310. 
32 Memorandum from Andrew H. Hirshfeld, Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy, for Patent 
Examining Corps (March 4, 2014), available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/myriad-
mayo_guidance.pdf. 
33 Id. 
34 See Mayo Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218. 
35 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. at 3231. 
36 35 USC § 101; Id. (quoting In Re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1013 (2008) (Rader, J., dissenting); see, e.g., D. Chorafas, 
Introduction to Derivative Financial Instruments 75-94 (2008); C. Stickney, R. Weil, K. Schipper, & J. Francis , 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING: AN INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS, METHODS, AND USES, 581-82 (13th ed. 2010); S. Ross, 
R. Westerfield, & B. Jordan, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 743-44 (8th ed. 2008). 
37 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. at 3231, 3249. 
38 Mayo Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. at 1305. 
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particular drug by measuring levels of the drug's metabolites in a patient's system, was not 
patentable.39  The Court reasoned that the processes covered by Prometheus’ patents do not 
transform otherwise unpatentable natural laws, in this case the correlation between the levels of 
the drug’s metabolites in the patient’s system with respect to the proper dosage the patient should 
be given, into patent-eligible applications in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 101.40  Laws of nature, 
in addition to abstract ideas, are expressly excluded from that definition.41  In the instance of 
Prometheus’ medical test, in addition to finding that it involved an application of an unpatentable 
law of nature, the Court also found that the claims merely contained steps that involved “well-
understood, routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers in the field.”42  
Thus, the patents Prometheus had were invalid, especially in light of Bilski. 
In the cases of Bilski and Prometheus, when a patent or claims therein are invalidated by 
the USPTO or courts, those respective sections become worthless.  In a sense, invalidation is a 
way of saying a patent or claims therein should not have been granted by the examiners.  Thus, 
invalid patents or claims are unenforceable against another entity for the purpose of an 
infringement lawsuit.43  With that consideration in mind, the focus of this Note now turns to the 
keystone case-line involving Myriad Genetics, Inc. and their patents with claims presently being 
litigated in numerous district courts.     
In 1996, Myriad Genetics located and sequenced two cancer susceptibility genes known 
as BRCA1 and BRCA2.44  Myriad developed and patented a genetic test for mutations in these 
genes and threatened to sue doctors and institutions that were using the BRCA deoxyribonucleic 
                                                                 
39 See Id.  
40 Id. 
41 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309, (1980). 
42 Mayo Collab. Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. at 1305. 
43 Mary L. Miller & Richard P. Vitek, Validity and Invalidity of Patent Claims, TECH. TRANSFER PRAC. MANUAL, 
excerpt available at http://www.autm.net/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Volume_3_TOC&Template=/CM/Content  
Display.cfm&ContentID=2207. 
44 Dorothy R. Auth, ‘Myriad Aftermath What Remains Patent Eligible? , 250 N.Y. L.J. 6 (2013) 
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acid (“DNA”) sequences to test patients for genetic predisposition to breast, ovarian, and prostate 
cancer.45  The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), the Association of Molecular 
Pathology (“AMP”) and several individual doctors, genetic counselors, scientific researchers, 
and patients challenged Myriad's patents and argued that human genes are not patent eligible and 
thus certain patent claims were invalid.46  The district court ruled against Myriad and found that 
all of Myriad's asserted DNA claims were products of nature and therefore patent ineligible 
under 35 U.S.C. §101.  The Federal Circuit reversed on appeal.47  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari, reaffirmed the district court’s holding by vacating the judgment of the Federal Circuit, 
and remanded back to the Federal Circuit.48   
On remand, the Federal Circuit again held that genomic DNA and the synthetic DNA 
molecule known as complementary DNA (“cDNA”) are patent eligible.49  The court reasoned 
that genomic DNA can be extracted from its cellular environment using a number of well-
established laboratory techniques.50  Thus, a particular segment of DNA, such as a gene, can then 
be excised or amplified from the DNA to obtain the isolated DNA segment of interest.51  
Likewise, DNA molecules can also be synthesized in the laboratory.52  However, in several 
processes analogous to those that occur in cells, naturally occurring sequences of genetic 
information serve as the template to create cDNA, a molecule that does not naturally exist 
                                                                 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. United States PTO, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Ass'n for Molecular 
Pathology v. United States PTO, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
48 Auth, supra note 44. 
49 Id. 
50 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. United States PTO, 689 F.3d at 1313. 
51 Id. 
52 Id.  
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because it is not a direct copy of the DNA sequence that it complements.53  Resultantly, the 
judges maintained divergent opinions that raised questions about the precise contours of DNA’s 
patent eligibility, especially with respect to cDNA’s patent eligibility.54   
Judge Alan D. Lourie's majority opinion upheld Myriad's BRCA DNA claims on the 
grounds that the chemical differences generated during the isolation process between naturally-
occurring and isolated DNA sequences created a non-naturally occurring molecule.55  The claims 
at issue were from U.S. Patent 5,747, 282, and recited: 
1. An isolated DNA coding for a BRCA1 polypep[]tide, said 
polypeptide having the amino acid sequence set forth in SEQ ID 
NO:2. 
2. The isolated DNA of claim 1, wherein said DNA has the 
nucleotide sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO:1. 
5. An isolated DNA having at least 15 nucleotides of the DNA of 
claim 1.56 
 
“SEQ ID NO:1” and “SEQ ID NO:2” correspond to the BRCA1 DNA coding region and 
the BRCA1 protein, respectively, and in his opinion, the isolated DNA that is removed from its 
native cellular environment has been manipulated in such a way that it is markedly different 
from what exists inside the body.57  Underscoring this notion was the idea that “courts must be 
cautious before adopting changes that disrupt the settled expectations of the inventing 
community.”58  
 Judge Kimberly A. Moore joined the majority’s judgment for cDNA sequences, and 
concurred in judgment with respect to the isolated DNA sequences, but wrote separately to 
                                                                 
53 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. United States PTO, 689 F.3d at 1313 (cDNA is generated from mRNA, and 
therefore only contain the coding regions of DNA known as exons.  DNA itself contains both exons and non -coding 
regions known as introns). 
54 Auth, supra note 44. 
55 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d at 1326. 
56 U.S. Patent 5,747, 282; Id. at 1309.  
57 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d at 1328. 
58 Id. at 1333 (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28 (1997)); Ariad Pharms., Inc. 
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).  
10 
 
explain her reasoning which was based on the USPTO’s history of awarding gene patents and the 
reliance interest of patent holders.59  She felt that “to the extent the majority rests its conclusion 
on the chemical differences between genomic and isolated DNA (breaking the covalent bonds), I 
cannot agree that this is sufficient to hold that the claims to human genes are directed to 
patentable subject matter.”60  If this case was decided on a blank canvas, Judge Moore may have 
concluded that isolated DNA are not patentable subject matter, and again she points to the same 
principle as the majority highlights that “we must be particularly wary of expanding the judicial 
exception to patentable subject matter where both settled expectations and extensive property 
rights are involved.”61   
Judge William C. Bryson, concurring in part and dissenting in part, argued the genetic 
similarities between naturally occurring and isolated BRCA DNA dwarfed any chemical 
differences between the two.62  Judge Bryson believed that although Myriad had valid claims to 
cDNA, Myriad did not have valid claims to the BRCA genes and associated gene fragments.63  
In his opinion, “Myriad's claims to the isolated BRCA genes seem to me to fall clearly on the 
‘unpatentable’ side of the line the Court drew in Chakrabarty.  Myriad is claiming the genes 
themselves, which appear in nature on the chromosomes of living human beings.”64  He 
concludes that “[t]here is no collective right of adverse possession to intellectual property, and 
we should not create one” and that “[o]ur role is to interpret the law that Congress has written in 
accordance with the governing precedents.”  Given that Judge Bryson would affirm the district 
court's rulings as to the BRCA gene and BRCA gene segment claims, which ruled that DNA is 
                                                                 
59 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
60 Id. at 1341. 
61 Id. at 1343. 
62 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
63 Id. at 1348. 
64 Id. at 1350. 
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patent ineligible subject matter, these divergent positions set the stage for a subsequent appeal to 
the Supreme Court.65 
In the most recent iteration of Myriad, when presented with the question of whether 
Myriad’s patents and claims to isolated BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene gave Myriad the exclusive 
right to isolate an individual’s BRCA1 and BRCA1 gene, the Supreme Court held that, 
“separating [a] gene from its surrounding genetic material is not an act of invention,” and that 
genes isolated from human DNA claimed in Myriad's patents were not patentable because the 
“location and order” of the molecules in those genes “existed in nature before Myriad found 
them” even though the process of isolating nucleic acids, the building blocks of DNA, involves 
changing their structure by breaking chemical bonds.66  Now, isolated genomic DNA is 
classified as a product of nature and therefore patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. §101.67  Though, 
cDNA is still patent eligible because it is not naturally occurring.68  The Supreme Court’s 
holding therefore upheld the patentability of cDNA, but reversed the Federal Circuit’s 
determination of the patentability of isolated DNA.69   
For the first time the Court made it exceedingly clear that Myriad’s mere discovery of the 
precise location and genetic sequence of BRCA1 and BRCA2 within chromosomes 17 and 13 
did not amount to a patentable invention.70  However, despite losing five of Myriad’s 520 patent 
claims to BRCA1 and BRCA 2 DNA patents, notably including the three claims previously 
mentioned, Myriad maintained its claims to cDNA.71  The Court agreed that cDNA is patent 
                                                                 
65 Id. at 1358; Auth, supra note 44. 
66 Myriad Genetics, No. 12-398, slip op. at 12; Brian Resnick, Why is Myriad Genetics Still Filing Patent Suits for 
Breast-Cancer Tests?, NAT ’L  J. (2013). 
67 Auth, supra note 44. 
68 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2109. 
69 Resnick, supra note 66. 
70 Dayrel S. Sewell, Unanimous U.S. Supreme Court and Angelina Jolie: BRCA1 & BRCA2 Patentability , INTELL. 
PROP. TODAY 24 (2013). 
71 Id. 
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eligible because cDNA is synthesized in such a way that it is non-naturally occurring and is not 
simply isolated.72  Thus, cDNA evaded the law of nature exception to patent eligibility.73 
Just hours after the Myriad decision was released, the USPTO sent out a memorandum to 
all patent examiners.74  The memo advised that, “[e]xaminers should now reject product claims 
drawn solely to naturally occurring nucleic acids or fragments thereof, whether isolated or not, as 
being ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”75  Although that particular piece of 
guidance is directly in line with the Myriad decision, a later sentence highlights uncertainty for 
the future by stating that “[o]ther claims, including method claims, that involve naturally 
occurring nucleic acids may give rise to eligibility issues and should be examined under the 
existing guidance in Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) 2106, Patent Subject 
Matter Eligibility.”76  “Method” claims are another word for “process” claims, and the USPTO 
statement here is a cause for substantial concern among patent practitioners and research 
institutions because the memorandum mentioned possible eligibility issues of method claims, 
despite the fact that the Myriad holding was expressly confined to non-method claims.77  With 
this dichotomy, the memo concludes by stating: “[t]he USPTO is closely reviewing the decision 
in Myriad and will issue more comprehensive guidance on patent subject matter eligibility 
determinations, including the role isolation plays in those determinations.”78  On March 4, 2014, 
the USPTO issued its guidance.79 
                                                                 
72 Id. 
73 Id.  
74 Memorandum from Andrew H. Hirshfeld, Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy, for Patent 
Examining Corps (June 13, 2013), available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/myriad_20130613.pdf. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2119. 
78 Hirshfeld, supra note 74. 
79 Memorandum from Andrew H. Hirshfeld, Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy, for Patent 
Examining Corps (March 4, 2014), available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/myriad-
mayo_guidance.pdf. 
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B: USPTO Guidance 
In light of Myriad, the USPTO issued guidance for all claims reciting or involving laws 
of nature/natural principles, natural phenomena, and/or natural products.80  Notably, as this 
guidance memo, like all USPTO memorandum, is not binding law, either the legislature can 
enact superseding statutes or the court can release overruling opinions.  Myriad is a prime 
example of that notion.81  The USPTO expressly stated that “while the holding in Myriad was 
limited to nucleic acids, Myriad is a reminder that claims reciting or involving natural products 
should be examined for a marked difference under Chakrabarty.”82  To do so, this flowchart 
should be followed by examiners.83  
84 
This chart illustrates a procedure that has streamlined this area of patent examination by 
clearly defining, in a test of sorts, what qualifies as eligible subject matter and what does not 
qualify as eligible subject matter.85  It is no longer a subjective test with an open standard, but 
                                                                 
80 Id. 
81 See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2119. 
82 Hirshfeld, supra note 79. 
83 Hirshfeld, supra note 79. 
84 Hirshfeld, supra note 79. 
85 Hirshfeld, supra note 79. 
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rather an objective one that follows this precise analysis, even with respect to the weighing of 
twelve factors for ascertaining whether something is significantly different than a judicial 
exception.86  Though, the USPTO did not create this protocol, and in fact, it appears that this 
analytical framework has been derived from Judge Robert W. Sweet from the Southern District 
of New York.87  In the first opinion on the merits in the Myriad case-line, Judge Sweet held that 
fifteen of Myriad’s claims spanning seven patents were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and 
issued a declaratory judgment against Myriad.88  Judge Sweet’s analysis of the claims followed 
the structure above.89  Because the isolated DNA molecules were a composition of matter, yet 
also a judicial exception as a product of nature, Judge Sweet then turned his analysis to whether 
the isolated DNA was markedly different from native DNA.90  Judge Sweet opined that the 
isolated DNA was not markedly different from native DNA, and could not be markedly different, 
because of the very nature of DNA.91  The claims to isolated BRCA1 and BRCA2 DNA, in order 
to serve any importance for genetic testing, must maintain the “defining characteristic of DNA in 
its native . . . form [and this] mandates the conclusion that the challenged composition claims are 
directed to unpatentable products of nature.”92       
In summation, the first question essentially asks if something is directed to patentable 
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and if it is not then it cannot be patentable.93  The second 
question asks if there is a judicial exception and if not then the subject matter is patent eligible.94  
The third question asks if the claim is significantly different from an unpatentable judicial 
                                                                 
86 Hirshfeld, supra note 79. 
87 See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. United States PTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
88 Id. at 211. 
89 Id. at 227-28. 
90 Id.  
91 Id. at 229. 
92 Id. 
93 Hirshfeld, supra note 79. 
94 Hirshfeld, supra note 79. 
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exception, and is therefore patent eligible subject matter.95  To analyze whether something is 
significantly different, there are six factors that weigh in favor of eligibility and six factors that 
weigh against eligibility.96 
Factors that weigh toward eligibility (significantly different):  
 
a) Claim is a product claim reciting something that initially 
appears to be a natural product, but after analysis is determined to 
be non-naturally occurring and markedly different in structure 
from naturally occurring products.  
b) Claim recites elements/steps in addition to the judicial 
exception(s) that impose meaningful limits on claim scope, i.e., the 
elements/steps narrow the scope of the claim so that others are not 
substantially foreclosed from using the judicial exception(s).  
c) Claim recites elements/steps in addition to the judicial 
exception(s) that relate to the judicial exception in a significant 
way, i.e., the elements/steps are more than nominally, 
insignificantly, or tangentially related to the judicial exception(s).  
d) Claim recites elements/steps in addition to the judicial 
exception(s) that do more than describe the judicial exception(s) 
with general instructions to apply or use the judicial exception(s).  
e) Claim recites elements/steps in addition to the judicial 
exception(s) that include a particular machine or transformation of 
a particular article, where the particular machine/transformation 
implements one or more judicial exception(s) or integrates the 
judicial exception(s) into a particular practical application. (See 
MPEP 2106(II)(B)(1) for an explanation of the machine or 
transformation factors).  
f) Claim recites one or more elements/steps in addition to the 
judicial exception(s) that add a feature that is more than well-
understood, purely conventional or routine in the relevant field. 
 
Factors that weigh against eligibility (not significantly different):  
 
g) Claim is a product claim reciting something that appears to 
be a natural product that is not markedly different in structure from 
naturally occurring products.  
h) Claim recites elements/steps in addition to the judicial 
exception(s) at a high level of generality such that substantially all 
practical applications of the judicial exception(s) are covered.  
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i) Claim recites elements/steps in addition to the judicial 
exception(s) that must be used/taken by others to apply the judicial 
exception(s). 
j) Claim recites elements/steps in addition to the judicial 
exception(s) that are well-understood, purely conventional or 
routine in the relevant field.  
k) Claim recites elements/steps in addition to the judicial 
exception(s) that are insignificant extra-solution activity, e.g., are 
merely appended to the judicial exception(s). 
l) Claim recites elements/steps in addition to the judicial 
exception(s) that amount to nothing more than a mere field of 
use.97  
 
In practice, these factors are applied in the same fashion as a judge would in a court of law.  The 
USPTO even provided some examples for what examiners should find when required to analyze 
claims within this field.98 
Not surprisingly, the weighing of those twelve factors complements the Myriad decision.  
One factor weighing against eligibility is whether the “[c]laim is a product claim reciting 
something that appears to be a natural product that is not markedly different in structure from 
naturally occurring products.”99  Under this analysis, because isolated DNA is not markedly 
different from the chromosomal DNA, as its nucleotide sequence has not been changed, isolated 
DNA is unpatentable.100  Although there is a resulting difference in the molecule’s structure, that 
does not rise to the level of a marked difference.101  Though, of absolute utmost importance is the 
analysis of cDNA under the twelve eligibility factors.  Even though the process of making cDNA 
is routine in the biotechnology art, the USPTO reasons that cDNA nonetheless has a nucleotide 
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sequence markedly different from naturally occurring DNA and is therefore patent eligible 
subject matter.102   
C: Myriad at Present and the Uncertain Future 
Shortly after the Supreme Court decision, Myriad fired back and filed infringement suits 
against its competitors.  Initially, Myriad filed suit against Ambry Genetics Corp. and Gene By 
Gene Ltd., who began offering BRCA1 and BRCA2 tests for $2,280 and $995 respectively, a 
price cheaper than the $4,000 Myriad charges.103  Since those two initial suits, Myriad also filed 
suit against BioReference Laboratories, Inc. (“BioReference”) in Utah federal court alleging that 
BioReference, through its genetic sequencing laboratory subsidiary, GeneDx, Inc., is infringing 
on Myriad’s intellectual property by offering OncoGeneDx, a comprehensive series of inherited 
cancer carrier testing, which includes testing for BRCA1 and BRCA2.104  Myriad later sued 
Invitae claiming infringement of claims in eleven patents underlying Myriad's BRACAnalysis 
test for hereditary breast and ovarian cancer risk.105  Invitae responded by countersuing for a 
declaratory judgment of non-infringement.106 Additionally, Quest Diagnostics (“Quest”) sought 
declaratory judgment that it would not be infringing on Myriad’s patents by selling tests for the 
BRCA genes, and Myriad filed suit against Quest, too.107  Further, a sixth entity, Counsyl, is 
seeking a declaratory judgment, similar to Quest, that it is not infringing upon Myriad’s 
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patents.108  To date, only Ambry and Gene By Gene countersued Myriad claiming anti-trust 
violations.109  However, Myriad and Gene By Gene have settled their suits with each other.110  
As part of the terms, Gene By Gene cannot sell its genetic test for BRCA1 and BRCA2 alone, 
but can continue to sell its array that tests multiple genes including BRCA1 and BRCA2.111      
Fundamentally, Myriad believes they possess valid patent claims covering what they 
consider a new biomarker, new reagents and techniques for analyzing the biomarker, and new 
methods for determining a patient’s risk of breast and ovarian cancer using these reagents and 
techniques.112  Myriad argues the 515 valid claims it still holds relating to the BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 tests are sufficient for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.113  Importantly, the 
Supreme Court holding in Myriad only invalidated five of Myriad’s original 520 claims spanning 
the many patents it holds on BRCA1 and BRCA2 genetic testing.114   
Despite the fact that Myriad maintains it still has 515 valid and enforceable claims in 
twenty-four patents underlying its test, companies are fighting back.  A spokesperson from Quest 
said the company expected Myriad's lawsuit and described it as “merely the latest in a pattern of 
behavior toward any test provider that introduces a new option in BRCA testing that can benefit 
patients.”115  Quest is apparently confident that its genetic test does not violate any of Myriad’s 
claims and will vigorously defend its product.116  Invitae alleges in its complaint that its 
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comprehensive test offers the sequencing of over 200 human genes for less than the single 
Myriad BRCA1/2 test.117  Invitae further asserts that its genetic test is not covered by any valid 
claim of a Myriad patent.118  Even more dramatic, based on the Federal Circuit’s holding that 
was neither appealed to nor decided by the Supreme Court, Invitae alleges that approximately 
fifty additional claims in four of Myriad’s patents should be invalidated under the grounds that 
they are invalid method claims.119  Time will tell who indeed is correct, and on what precise 
grounds, because a court’s finding of either infringement or non-infringement necessarily implies 
a straightforward winner and loser, as opposed to the narrow ruling of the Myriad decision where 
the Supreme Court invalidated just five claims spanning all of Myriad’s patents.  Absent 
settlement, one party must prevail, and the future of the genetic testing industry could be forever 
changed.  This outcome could be drastic for many reasons, one of which is rooted in the AIA and 
discussed below. 
Part III: Post Grant Proceedings 
 A: Overview of the AIA’s New Post Grant Proceedings 
There are several ways that third parties can have patents or claims canceled by the 
USPTO.  It is certainly advantageous to contest patents in the USPTO, as opposed to the federal 
courts, and even more so after the AIA.  Before the AIA, patent cancellation options available to 
third parties through the USPTO included: third party prior art submissions, ex parte 
reexamination, and inter partes reexamination.120  Third party prior art submissions allowed for 
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third parties to submit patents, published patent applications, or printed publications that may be 
relevant to the examination of a patent application.121  Ex parte reexamination allowed for third 
parties to challenge any unexpired patents on the basis of novelty, obviousness, and claim 
scope.122  Such challenges would be successful if there was a substantial new question of 
patentability.123  Inter partes reexamination was very similar to ex parte reexamination, but it was 
a more extensive and costly proceeding that revolved around the petitioner prevailing upon 
proving the reasonable likelihood of success as to at least one claim.124  However, the patent 
community criticized those options.125  Third party prior art submissions were simply 
inadequate; ex parte reexamination was too narrow in scope and too lengthy in pendency; and 
inter partes reexamination was viewed as too risky in light of its estoppel provisions.126  Also, 
under the old provisions, there were the ever present concerns about using the judicial system to 
resolve patent disputes in the United States, including, but not limited to: cost, nearly unlimited 
discovery, lay juries, and lengthy pendency.127   
With the rollout of the AIA, there have been some changes to these patent cancellation 
options.  First, third party prior art submissions have been adapted to better serve their purpose of 
providing patent examiners with the best possible prior art references and are now known as pre-
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issuance submissions.128  Pre-issuance submissions now allow for third parties to accompany 
their submissions of patents, published patent applications, or printed publications with a concise 
written description of the relevance of those documents.129  Second, ex parte reexamination is 
fundamentally still in place and is instituted under the same general standard of review, but there 
are some key changes.  It has been renamed to post-grant review (“PGR”) and has been better 
adapted to serve its intended function of quasi-judicial administrative proceedings that will help 
relieve some of the burden of patent litigation from domestic federal courts.130  Third, inter 
partes reexamination has been replaced by inter partes review (“IPR”) and is instituted under the 
same standard of review, but can only be initiated on the basis of novelty and nonobviousness 
concerns, as opposed to also enablement, which can be done in PGR, and arguably even 
patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 101, which is discussed below.131  Both IPR and PGR are 
statutorily designed to be resolved within one year of their institution, as opposed to the pre-AIA 
proceedings that would last either two or three years.132   
Also notably with IPR, although estoppel applies to the petitioner in an IPR, those 
provisions only apply to the petitioner, and that entity cannot request or maintain a subsequent 
proceeding before USPTO with respect to any challenged patent claim on any ground that was 
raised or reasonably could have been raised in the IPR.133  This leaves open the door for other 
third parties to initiate a subsequent IPR.134  Likewise, the petitioner may not assert in a 
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subsequent district court or action that a claim is invalid on any ground that was raised or 
reasonably could have been raised in the IPR.135  Again, that provision only impacts the original 
petitioner.136  These provisions are the extent of estoppel, and invalidity opinions will absolutely 
not carry over between patents.137  Thus, it is more efficient to have a court ruling invalidating 
entire classes of patents instead of individual opinions collectively accomplishing the same 
result, and this naturally lends itself to the necessity of the courts subsequently deciding 
Myriad’s unsettled litigation.  The focus now turns to what precise effects that unsettled 
litigation will have on both PGR and IPR, respectively. 
B: PGR 
Congressional hearings held between 2001 and 2006 explored the creation of PGR 
proceedings where patents can be challenged early in life and on all validity grounds.138  During 
that time, the core intellectual property professional organizations, and accompanying reports 
and studies, called for the establishment of such a proceeding.139  At a 2004 House Intellectual 
Property Subcommittee hearing, the American Intellectual Property Law Association (“AIPLA”) 
Executive Director, Michael Kirk, presented the main argument for authorizing post-grant 
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review.140  He believed that it is often prohibitively expensive or even impossible to test the 
validity of a newly-issued patent that is of dubious validity, and the continued existence of such a 
patent can disrupt product development in a field of technology for years.141  Invalid or 
overbroad patents both discourage follow-on innovation, thereby preventing competition, and 
also raise prices through unnecessary licensing and litigation.142  Yet another reason for 
authorizing PGR is because the “USPTO is a particularly appropriate venue for making validity 
determinations in a cost-effective and technically sophisticated environment.”143  It stands to 
reason that PGR serves a significant and substantial purpose.144  
Section 6 of the AIA amended Chapter 31's authorization of inter partes proceedings and 
created the new PGR administrative proceedings.145  The law now allows the Director of the 
USPTO to institute PGR proceedings if he finds that the information presented in the petition 
and any response "[show] that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail 
with respect to at least one of the claims challenged in the petition."146   
PGR, for petitions filed on or after March 19, 2013, costs $12,000 plus a fee of $250.00 
for each claim in excess of 20 within the patent, and the post-institution fee is $18,000 plus a fee 
of $550.00 for each claim in excess of 15 within the patent.147  Thus, for $32,750, up to 20 claims 
in a single patent can be reviewed in PGR, with an additional cost of $800 per claim reviewed in 
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excess of 20.  Post-institution fees represent fees that are paid upfront but are refunded in the 
event that the petitioner’s request for PGR is denied.148   
In part, 35 U.S.C. § 321, the provision enacted for post-grant proceedings, states: “[a] 
petitioner in a post-grant review may request to cancel as unpatentable 1 or more claims of a 
patent on any ground that could be raised under paragraph (2) or (3) of section 282(b) (relating to 
invalidity of the patent or any claim).”149  Of particular relevance in the analysis is 35 U.S.C. § 
321(b), which defines the grounds under 282(b).150  35 U.S.C. § 282(b) states: 
(b) Defenses.— The following shall be defenses in any action involving the 
validity or infringement of a patent and shall be pleaded:  
(1) Noninfringement, absence of liability for infringement or unenforceability. 
(2) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit on any ground specified in part II 
as a condition for patentability. 
(3) Invalidity of the patent or any claim in suit for failure to comply with—
(A) any requirement of section 112, except that the failure to disclose the best 
mode shall not be a basis on which any claim of a patent may be canceled or 
held invalid or otherwise unenforceable; or (B) any requirement of section 251. 
(4) Any other fact or act made a defense by this title.”151  
 
Limiting the analysis to the specified paragraphs (2) and (3), post-grant proceedings can 
be brought up against patents for reasons including something that is “a condition for 
patentability” or violations of 35 U.S.C. §§ 112 or 251.152  For the purpose of this discussion, the 
primary concern is defining the phrase “a condition for patentability.” 
It has long been understood, by some that the Patent Act sets out the conditions for 
patentability in three sections: §101, §102, and §103.153  There is a plethora of additional 
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precedent for that same notion.154  In the eyes of the USPTO leadership, commentators 
incorrectly note that because 35 U.S.C. § 101 is not expressly stated within the text of 35 U.S.C. 
§ 282(b)(3), it is therefore not a condition for patentability and cannot be grounds for PGR.155  
However, the USPTO leadership opines that commentators further incorrectly assert that because 
35 U.S.C. § 101 is not included in 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2), even though 35 U.S.C. § 101 is 
included “in part II” of Title 35, 35 U.S.C. § 101 is not “specified in part II as a condition for 
patentability” when it is entitled “[i]nventions patentable,” as opposed to 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 
103 that are both entitled “[c]onditions for patentability.”156  Despite this seemingly valid statutory 
contention, the USPTO leadership does not find that argument persuasive and believes that for the 
purpose of PGR, 35 U.S.C. § 101 is considered a condition for patentability.157 
The Supreme Court previously held that 35 U.S.C. § 101 is absolutely a condition for 
patentability.158   In Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City,159 the Supreme Court stated in 
dicta that the 1952 Patent Act “sets out the conditions of patentability in three sections,” citing 
35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, and 103.160  The Supreme Court also addressed invalidity under 35 
U.S.C. § 101 when it was raised as a defense to an infringement claim under 35 U.S.C. § 282.161   
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Additionally, the Federal Circuit expressly rejected the argument, raised by the dissenting 
judge in Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber162 that 35 U.S.C. § 101 is not a “condition for patentability” 
under 35 U.S.C. § 282, stating that “the defenses provided in the statute, 35 U.S.C. § 282, 
include not only the conditions of patentability in 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, but also those in 35 
U.S.C. § 101.”163  The Federal Circuit in Dealertrack clarified that the use of the term 
“conditions for patentability” in the titles of 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, but not 35 U.S.C. § 101, 
did not change the result, relying on the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Pennsylvania 
Department of Corrections v. Yeskey,164 that a statute’s title “is of use only when it sheds light on 
some ambiguous word or phrase” in the statute and that it “cannot limit the plain meaning of the 
text.”165  
Though, in so-called additional considerations by the Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit, 
Chief Judge Rader posits that the Supreme Court long ago held that 35 U.S.C. § 101 is not a 
“condition of patentability.”166  Chief Judge Rader acknowledges that the statute does not list 35 
U.S.C. § 101 among invalidity defenses to infringement, but that with regards to 35 U.S.C. § 
282, while invalidity for failing to meet a “condition of patentability” is among the authorized 
defenses, 35 U.S.C. § 101 is nonetheless not a “condition of patentability.”167   
However, contrary to the views expressed by some of the judges of the Federal Circuit, 
the legislative history of the AIA makes it clear that Congress instituted the Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board (PTAB) to consider challenges brought under 35 U.S.C. § 101 in post-grant 
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reviews.168  A House Committee Report states that “the post-grant review proceeding permits a 
challenge on any ground related to invalidity under section 282.”169  Likewise, Arizona Senator 
Jon Kyl also included “section 101 invention issues” among those “that can be raised in post-
grant review.”170  Summarily, even though the opinions of some judges on the Federal Circuit 
are that 35 U.S.C § 101 is not a condition for patentability, in the view of the USPTO, the PTAB 
should consider patentability challenges brought under 35 U.S.C. § 101 in post-grant reviews.171  
Unless the courts or Congress direct the USPTO otherwise, that is what the USPTO will continue 
to do.172 
This is significant because it means that patents or patent claims can be canceled by a 
third party for a fraction of the cost of litigation.173  A 2005 study found that 4,382 of the 23,688 
human genes in the National Center for Biotechnology Information's gene database are explicitly 
claimed as intellectual property.174  Patents with claims to those 4,382 genes will be safe from 
PGR, because PGR can only be implemented on patents filed after March 16, 2013.  But, future 
patents issued are now possibly at stake for being invalidated after Myriad through PGR.175  PGR 
could be instituted for a patent on the basis that the twelve factors examiners consider when 
reviewing patent applications under 35 U.S.C. § 101 demonstrate that it is “more likely than not 
that at least one claim is unpatentable.”176  So, simply showing that more factors weigh against 
patentability rather than for patentability should be enough to invalidate a patent via PGR.    
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C: IPR 
Amended by the AIA, 35 U.S.C. § 311 defines its scope as: “[a] petitioner in an inter 
partes review may request to cancel as unpatentable 1 or more claims of a patent only on a 
ground that could be raised under section 102 or 103 and only on the basis of prior art consisting 
of patents or printed publications.”177  Therefore, an IPR cannot be directed to 35 U.S.C. § 
101.178  So, Myriad does not provide a basis for patent invalidation in an IPR because the holding 
that DNA sequences are nonpatentable subject matter, is not within the scope of an IPR.  As a 
result, Myriad has no notable effect on IPR because the Myriad holding implicated changes to 
the scope of patentable subject matter with respect to 35 U.S.C. § 101, and none of the other 
conditions for patentability.179     
Presently, post-Myriad, the relevant considerations are how the new post-grant 
proceedings will impact existing and future patents.  However, with the AIA, Myriad has a more 
profound effect on patents issued from applications filed after March, 16, 2013 because of 
PGR.180  Though, this is expressly under the condition that a PGR must be requested on or prior 
to nine months after patent issuance.181  For newly issued patents, there is a nine-month window 
in which a PGR can be filed, and after that nine-month window, only an IPR can be filed.182  
Resultantly, the terms of the statutes will only allow a 35 U.S.C. § 101 cause of action to be 
brought in a PGR, and not in an IPR.183  Therefore, for IPR to be relevant for invalidating patents 
to genes or genetic testing, for example, case law would need to evolve such that something that 
was previously patentable is now unpatentable in light of either 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 or 103 for lack 
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of novelty or due to obviousness.  The case law could feasibly evolve in that way, in some 
respects, but in the meantime, the future possibilities will be contemplated.  
Part IV: The Future of Genetic Testing in a Post-Myriad World 
A. If Myriad is Defeated in Subsequent Litigation 
If Myriad is defeated in any of the now-pending litigations, and the courts hold that, for 
whatever reason, Myriad loses its monopoly over BRCA1 and BRCA2, the ramifications might 
be enormous.  Myriad itself might not be terribly affected as its patents are expiring over the next 
several years and that would likely be before litigation even ends, but other patent holders with 
claims to genes could find those patents invalidated.184  Myriad could lose if a future court holds, 
for example, that Myriad’s genetic test is now considered obvious, in accordance with 35 U.S.C. 
§ 103 and therefore unpatentable in light of the fact that DNA is no longer patentable subject 
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  Such a holding implies that a previously undiscovered genetic 
sequence cannot provide the basis for a previously known process utilizing the previously 
unknown genetic sequence.  Because of this, the genetic testing industry would come to a 
grinding halt as companies’ patents could be brought into PGR so long as they were issued 
within the past nine months.  Resultantly, companies could freely use what was once patented by 
another company that may have invested substantial amounts of money and time.  Also, at that 
point, companies would stop filing patents and stop investing in genetic testing research.  This is 
precisely what Dr. Watson wanted to avoid, but it would ironically be the consequence of a 
dramatic court ruling.185 
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Representatives of Myriad said that, “[t]o create tests for hereditary breast cancer and 
ovarian cancer, our company and its investors spent more than $500 million over 17 years before 
we were able to recoup this investment.”186  That is quite a staggering figure.  A study in 2011 
indicates that nine medical schools received that much money in the year 2011.187  Likewise, 
only two universities attained that mark in 2008.188  This money was to fund the entirety of those 
particular schools’ research in the biological sciences, and not merely one particular study or 
development.189  The studies are quite clear, however, in pointing out that individual labs are 
generally funded with merely hundreds of thousands of dollars.190  Even prestigious grants are a 
mere drop in the bucket compared to Myriad’s expenditure.191   
B: Impact of Future Myriad Loss on Post Grant Proceedings 
 In the event Myriad again loses in subsequent litigation, any arguments asserted against 
their patents’ validity could then be used, generally, with respect to every seemingly applicable 
patent by way of post-grant proceedings, either IPR or PGR.  Thus, a loss for Myriad means a 
loss for every other patent that could be invalidated for similar reasons. 
 The logic the Court used in Prometheus could realistically be applied by future courts to 
hold that certain genetic tests, specifically Myriad’s, are wholly unpatentable subject matter.192  
In Prometheus, just as a natural correlation was found to be unpatentable subject matter when it 
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was incorporated into a known diagnostic test, an analogous situation may very well exist where 
a future court decides that isolated human DNA, as unpatentable subject matter, cannot be used 
in conjunction with a known diagnostic test in order to ultimately create patentable subject 
matter.193  As a result, any patents granted within the past nine months with claims to a similarly 
situated genetic test would be directly affected by the new changes to post-grant proceedings 
wherein PGR could be instituted under 35 U.S.C. § 101 grounds for invalidity.194  However, a 
court could potentially invalidate Myriad’s claims for other reasons.  For example, a court could 
hold that using a procedurally known genetic test with what is now unpatentable isolated human 
DNA is actually obvious, and therefore unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103.195  As unpatentable 
under this section, IPR could then potentially be invoked.  This therefore means that any patent 
analogous to Myriad’s invalidated patents could be subject to post-grant review proceedings 
regardless of when they were issued.196   
Although that notion is contrary to the USPTO guidance, the ramifications of such a 
court holding would be disastrous as the results would cut against one of the main purposes of 
instituting reformed post-grant proceedings, and that was to avoid lengthy periods of litigation in 
the federal courts.197  Undoubtedly this conclusion necessarily implies there would be a massive 
overload of the USPTO’s post-grant proceeding infrastructure, but it is hard not to imagine such 
an occurrence.  Given how lucrative genetic testing appears to be, especially considering Myriad 
is presently entangled in six suits, a competitor looking to enter the industry could simply file a 
substantially cheaper post-grant proceeding with the USPTO instead of having to file a 
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declaratory judgment invalidating a competitors’ patent.198  If the goal is to capture the market 
share by keeping prices down, companies such as Invitae and Counsyl would bring companies 
like Myriad into one of the options for post-grant proceedings, if given the chance.199  
C: Myriad is Victorious in Subsequent Litigation 
 If Myriad wins in subsequent litigation, then life continues as it has for as long as genetic 
tests have been patented.  DNA tests were invented in the mid-1980s, so this is all relatively 
recent technology.200  Although Myriad’s victory directly opposes Dr. Watson’s ideology of 
research not being stymied by gene patents, this outcome actually indirectly supports the very 
same ideology.201  Companies like Myriad would invest in research only because of the promise 
of the twenty-years of exclusivity granted by patents.202  Thus, keeping the status quo in check 
may very well be the ideal ending.  It seems patently unfair for companies to have invested 
potentially hundreds of millions of dollars and accomplished something extraordinary that no 
one else has been able to do or would have been able to do otherwise, and then discover they 
cannot actually enjoy the fruits of their labor.   
Surely the public directly benefits from being able to obtain diagnostic medicine at a 
cheaper price, but it is also the public that is indirectly harmed.203  As previously explained, 
universities cannot conduct research of the same magnitude and expense as private corporations, 
therefore, research in the field of genetic testing may cease to exist in its current form.204  Thus, 
it seems practical for companies that have invested tremendous amounts of money in scientific 
breakthroughs to be able to recoup those expenditures.  For centuries, the primary way that has 
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been accomplished has been through patents necessarily promoting inventions and 
innovations.205  For their bottom lines, companies need a reason to invest in something in 
particular, and taking away those incentives, patents in the case of genetic testing, could be 
devastating for any potential future developments.   
D: Broad Interpretation of Myriad Impacting Future Patent Law Practice   
Myriad can impact the pharmaceutical industry in other ways besides genetic testing.  
Just as the Court held in Myriad that DNA is not patentable solely because it was isolated, 
precedent could come down either from the courts or from the USPTO that proteins, for 
example, are no longer patentable in a form currently claimed in patents because they are 
naturally occurring and are merely isolated.206   
Though, as a whole, one thing the Supreme Court made clear in Myriad is that it will not 
show deference to existing patent law practice and it may render holdings contrary to the desires 
of the USPTO or even the Federal Circuit.207  As an example, when presently considering patent 
eligibility of a small molecule or protein isolated or purified from a natural source, the latest 
edition of the USPTO’s MPEP instructs that “[p]urer forms of known products may be 
patentable” and that “[p]ure materials are novel vis-à-vis less pure or impure materials because 
there is a difference between pure and impure materials,” suggesting potential patent eligibility 
of purified substances from natural sources.208  To the extent that these guidelines support 
patentability of a small molecule or protein isolated or purified from a natural source, and to the 
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extent that the USPTO has previously granted claims to such substances, Myriad suggests that 
these current and past practices by the agency may not be entitled to deference.209   
Conclusion 
 Moving forward as a society, it is imperative for companies investing time and money 
into the development of genetic tests to be able to obtain patents for these tremendous inventions.  
Should that cease to be the case, it is imaginable that most biotechnology companies will move 
on to other, more profitable areas of research.  When that happens, nothing short of legislative 
action could fill the void left behind of billions of dollars of research funding.  Fortunately, this 
grim outcome can be avoided in two respects.  First, courts adjudicating the future Myriad cases 
could feasibly issue narrow holdings against Myriad that will not have a broad-sweeping effect 
on the rest of the industry.  These holdings could be limited to the facts in the case as it relates to 
comparing Myriad’s genetic tests with those genetics tests of its competitors for determinations 
of patent validity or invalidity or patent infringement or non-infringement on a case-by-case 
basis.  Second, as justice so requires, courts could rule for Myriad.  If Myriad is found, despite 
any previous rulings, to in fact have invented new genetic tests that meet all of the statutory 
requirements of patentability, then Myriad should also be found to possess valid patents that can 
be enforceable against other entities, as applicable.  Post-grant proceedings fit into the broader 
picture because they present cheaper and quicker options for invalidating another’s, perhaps a 
competitor’s, patent and courts need to tread carefully and be mindful of those proceedings when 
issuing future decisions in the Myriad case line.  In short, the status quo can be maintained if 
Myriad either “wins” or “loses” in subsequent actions, even in light of the fact that Myriad 
already lost their claims to genes.  If Myriad “loses” again, what will then matter the most is the 
way in which they lost and the reasoning behind the courts’ holdings. 
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